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1 Introduction
In a contest, two or more players invest effort or other costly resources to win a prize. Many
economic interactions can be modeled as a contest. Promotions, for example, represent an
important incentive in many firms and organizations. Employees exert effort to perform better
than their colleagues and, thus, to be considered for promotion to a more highly paid position
within the firm. Litigation can also be understood as a contest, in which the different parties
spend time and resources to prevail in court. Procurement is a third example, where different
firms invest resources into developing a proposal or lobbying politicians, thereby increasing
the odds of being selected, receiving some rent in return.
Players participating in contests are typically heterogeneous in some respect. For instance,
employees differ with respect to their skills, the litigant parties differ with respect to the qual-
ity of the available evidence, and firms differ with respect to their capabilities of designing a
proposal. When accounting for such heterogeneity in contest models, equilibria are often asym-
metric, meaning that players choose different levels of efforts. Due to this asymmetry, contests
between heterogeneous players are typically difficult to analyze, and researchers have often
imposed rather strict assumptions to keep the analyses tractable.
In this paper, we provide a novel framework to study contests between (possibly) heteroge-
neous players. Under general assumptions about the production technology and skill distribu-
tions, the class of contests we study has a symmetric equilibrium in which all players exert the
same effort. This makes the contest much easier to investigate and allows us to study behavior
in situations that proved to be intractable in other contest models.
In the class of contests that we focus on, the outcome of the contest depends on players’
skills and their efforts. The skill distributions of the competing players (including the means)
are common knowledge, whereas the exact skill realizations are generally (symmetrically) un-
known (as, e.g., in Holmström 1982). In the example of the promotion contest, a player’s
expected ability may be commonly known (e.g., if the player’s education, prior work experi-
ence, or CV is known and serves as a signal of ability), whereas the exact ability level for
the particular job is unknown (e.g., since there is some uncertainty regarding how education
translates into workplace performance and job match). Similar arguments apply to the other
examples presented earlier. We assume that a player’s skill and effort determine the player’s
“contribution” to the contest and that the player with the highest contribution wins the con-
test. Heterogeneity among players is accounted for by allowing the statistical distributions of
possible skill realizations to be different for the competing players. Our model is general and
contains the well-known models by Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases.
We make three primary contributions.
First, we show that in a two-player contest, a symmetric (pure-strategy equal-effort) equi-
librium exists under general assumptions about the production technology (i.e., the function
mapping skill and effort into a player’s contribution to the contest) and individual skill dis-
tributions. The main requirement is that the production function is such that for any given
positive effort level, a player’s contribution to the contest is increasing in his skill. This is
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a weak requirement from the perspective of the most commonly used neoclassical production
technologies, and also appears to be quite realistic.
Second, we construct a link between our contest model and standard models of decision-
making under risk (expected utility theory). Exploiting this link, we revisit important compar-
ative statics results of contest theory and show how these can be overturned. In particular, we
analyze how equilibrium effort is affected by making the skill distributions of the competing
players more heterogeneous, investigating both the role of differences in expected skill (con-
ceptualized by first-order stochastic dominance) and the role of differences in the uncertainty
of the skill distributions of the competing players (conceptualized by second-order stochastic
dominance). The general message is that making contest participants more heterogeneous can
increase equilibrium effort. To the best of our knowledge, these results have not been found
in the contest literature before, and indeed contradict “standard” results (e.g., those from the
Tullock contest and the Lazear-Rosen tournament). Thus, the comparative statics results de-
rived from those standard models are not representative of the conclusions derived in the more
general model.
Third, in two important special cases, we provide novel results on the existence of symmet-
ric equilibria in our general setting when the number of players n is greater than two, and
analyze how equilibrium effort is affected by changes in n. We show that when n > 2, and
players have identical skill distributions, a symmetric equilibrium exists even in the presence
of general production technologies. We also show that, given certain assumptions on players’
skill distributions, a symmetric equilibrium exists when n−1 identical players compete against
a player who has a higher expected ability. In both cases, we investigate the effect of increas-
ing the number of players on equilibrium effort. Exploiting the fact that a contest with n > 2
players can be interpreted as a two-player contest in which every player competes against the
strongest (i.e., the largest order statistic) of the other competitors, we find that increasing the
number of contestants can increase equilibrium effort. This result can be understood by the
fact that as the number of contestants increases, the strongest opponents grow stronger in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, allowing us to apply our results from the two-player
case.
We discuss the trade-offs involved and provide intuition for all of our results. We also dis-
cuss the implications for optimal workforce composition and certain real-world applications in
the context of labor and personnel economics. For instance, our finding that efforts can in-
crease if the skill distribution of one of the competing players becomes more uncertain (in the
the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) has several interesting managerial implica-
tions. It indicates that contest organizers might wish to increase the uncertainty regarding
the skills of certain players in order to induce higher effort. In a worker-firm context, em-
ployers could achieve this by, for instance, hiring an inexperienced worker for whom less prior
information is available, or a minority worker with a skill level drawn from a distribution
that generally tends to be more uncertain (as argued, e.g., by Bjerk 2008). This means that a
diverse workforce might be desirable from the employer’s point of view.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the section 2 below, we discuss related literature.
Section 3 introduces the contest model and discusses how our model nests the Tullock contest
and the Lazear-Rosen tournament as special cases. Section 4 solves the two player model.
In section 5, we analyze the two player case in greater detail and provide a set of important
comparative statics results. Section 6 studies the n-player case and presents novel comparative
statics results for this case. Section 7 discusses implications for organizational design and
optimal workforce composition. Finally, section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs
of all our results.
2 Related literature
There are three main approaches to the study of contests, the Tullock or ratio-form contest,
the Lazear-Rosen tournament, and the all-pay auction.1 In the Tullock contest, a player’s win-
ning probability is given by the player’s contribution to the contest (which is a function of the
player’s effort and sometimes also of ability) divided by the total contribution to the contest of
all players. The Tullock contest has been introduced to the literature by Tullock (1980).2 It has
been axiomatized in various settings by Skaperdas (1996), Clark & Riis (1998), and Münster
(2009). The Lazear-Rosen tournament assumes that the player with the highest contribution to
the contest wins with certainty, and contributions depend on effort, some random factors (e.g.,
luck), and possibly on abilities. The seminal paper is by Lazear & Rosen (1981) who apply the
model in a labor-market context.3 The all-pay auction, finally, makes the same assumption as
the Lazear-Rosen tournament except that contributions to the contest are deterministic and do
not depend on random factors; a detailed equilibrium characterization was developed by Baye
et al. (1996).4
Most studies analyzing the Tullock contest and the Lazear-Rosen tournament impose as-
sumptions that ensure that equilibria in pure strategies exist. In contrast, only mixed-strategy
equilibria exist in the all-pay auction (when players are symmetrically informed about the de-
cision situation). As we indicated in the introduction, and as we explain in more detail in
section 3, the Tullock contest and the Lazear-Rosen tournament are special cases of our model,
while the all-pay auction is not. One important contribution of our paper is to generalize the
Tullock contest and the Lazear-Rosen tournament and show that important results of these
models do not always extend to more general production functions and ability distributions.
1The theoretical contest literature has been surveyed in a number of books and papers. See, e.g., Konrad (2009)
and Vojnovic´ (2015) for recent textbooks and Chowdhury & Gürtler (2015), Chowdhury et al. (2019), and Fu &
Wu (2019) for recent surveys.
2It has been further investigated by, e.g., Hillman & Riley (1989), Cornes & Hartley (2005), Fu & Lu (2009a,b),
Schweinzer & Segev (2012), Chowdhury & Kim (2017), Giebe & Schweinzer (2014, 2015).
3Further contributions include Malcomson (1984), O’Keeffe et al. (1984), Lazear (1989), Schotter & Weigelt
(1992), Hvide (2002), Grund & Sliwka (2005), Gürtler & Kräkel (2010), Schöttner & Thiele (2010), Gürtler &
Gürtler (2015), and Imhof & Kräkel (2016).
4The complete-information all-pay auction (with mixed-strategy equilibria) is the most commonly used in con-
test theory, but a private-values version can be found as well. The all-pay auction has been further studied by, e.g.,
Barut & Kovenock (1998), Moldovanu & Sela (2001, 2006), Moldovanu et al. (2007), Cohen et al. (2008), Siegel
(2009, 2010), Sela (2012), Morath & Münster (2013), Barbieri et al. (2014), and Fang et al. (2019).
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These important results refer to how player heterogeneity, the extent of risk or uncertainty,
and the number of players affects the effort exerted by competing players. For example, Schot-
ter & Weigelt (1992) have shown that efforts are higher when players have homogeneous skills
relative to when players are heterogeneous. The reason in their setting is that disadvantaged
players tend to give up and reduce their effort, whereas the advantaged players can afford to
reduce their effort. Moreover, several studies have shown that greater uncertainty regarding
the contest outcome tends to reduce effort (see, e.g., Hvide 2002). Intuitively, if the contest
outcome depends to a greater extent on random factors, effort has a lower impact on who be-
comes the winner and players reduce effort accordingly. Finally, in the seminal work of Tullock
(1980), effort decreases in the number of players who participate in the contest, which has been
attributed to a discouragement effect. If a player competes against many rivals, his chance of
winning is relatively low and the player reduces effort in turn. Although all of these results
seem highly intuitive, we find that they are sensitive to the choice of production technologies
and ability distributions. In our general framework, different comparative statics results may
emerge.
3 Model description
Consider a contest between two risk-neutral players i ∈ {1,2} who compete for a single prize
of value V > 0. Both players simultaneously choose effort e i ≥ 0, and the cost of effort c(e i)
is increasing, strictly convex, and satisfies c(0) = 0. Player i’s ability or skill is denoted by θi.
There is uncertainty about skills, which means that θi is a random variable.
5 The realization
of θi is not known to any of the players (not even player i). It is commonly known, however,
that θi is independently and continuously distributed according to the pdf f i (with cdf Fi) with
finite mean µi. The supports of θi, i ∈ {1,2}, overlap on a subset of R with positive measure.
The production of player i, and hence his or her contribution to the contest, is given by the
production function g(θi, e i). Importantly, we assume that
∂g
∂θi
> 0 for all e i > 0 which means
(realistically) that each player’s contribution to the contest is increasing with respect to his/her
skill, for a given level of effort.
Player i wins the contest if and only if his or her contribution is strictly higher than the
contribution of the opponent player, namely, g(θi, e i)> g(θk, ek) (with k ∈ {1,2}\{i}).6 We denote
by Pi(e i, ek) player i’s probability of winning the contest (as a function of the efforts of both
players) and we define the expected payoff as pii(e i, ek) := Pi(e i, ek)V − c(e i). We also define
eˆ := c−1(V ) and E := [0, eˆ]. A player’s equilibrium effort will always belong to the set E as the
probability of winning is bounded above by unity.
We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The primitives of the model are such that (i) pii(e i, ek) is continuously differen-
tiable and (ii) the pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium efforts are positive and characterized by the
5In our analysis, we always refer to θi as the player’s skill. Of course, θi could also account for any other
random variable affecting a player’s production.
6Notice that g(θi, e i)= g(θk, ek) happens with probability zero.
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first-order conditions to the players’ problems of maximizing pii(e i, ek), for all i,k ∈ {1,2}, i 6= k.
The validity of the first-order approach is typically ensured by imposing additional assump-
tions on the primitives of the model that guarantee that the objective functions pii are quasi-
concave and increasing at e i = 0. Previous papers in the contest-theory literature, however,
have shown that the first-order approach may be valid even when the objective functions are
neither quasi-concave nor increasing at e i = 0 (see, e.g., Figure 1 in Schweinzer & Segev 2012).
As we do not want to rule out such cases, we simply assume that the Nash-equilibrium efforts
are characterized by the players’ first-order conditions to their maximization problems without
restricting the shape of pii too strongly. Each of the theoretical results we present will be ac-
companied by at least one example for which we verify Assumption 1. Finally, we assume that
there exist e¯ i, e˘ i ∈ int E such that ∂pii(e i ,ek)∂e i |e1=e2=e¯ i < 0 and
∂pii(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e˘ i > 0. The assump-
tion ensures that the first-order condition to player i’s maximization problem can in principle
be fulfilled in a symmetric equilibrium.
Below we illustrate by example which contests, distributions and technologies are included
in the class of contests which we study in our model.
Tullock contest The well-studied Tullock contest represents a special case of our model.
This is easily illustrated using the results in Jia (2008), who considers a contest with a multi-
plicative production technology, in which player i wins if and only if θie i is highest among all
players. It is shown that if θi is distributed according to the pdf
f i (x)= γimx−(m+1)exp
{
−γix−m
}
I(x>0),
then player i wins the contest with probability
Pi (e1, e2)=
γie
m
i∑2
j=1γ je
m
j
,
where γ j ≥ 0 for both players j and m > 0. Hence, in our model, if g (θi, e i) = θie i, and θi is
distributed according to the above pdf, then we obtain the Tullock contest-success function.
Lazear-Rosen tournament (additive noise) Assuming the production technology g(θi, e i)=
θi+e i, our model includes the standard Lazear-Rosen tournament model (in the original Lazear
& Rosen 1981, it is assumed that µi = 0). We provide several new results for this well-known
setting.
General production technologies Our framework is quite general with respect to the pro-
duction technology g(θi, e i). For example, feasible technologies include the CES production
function g(θi, e i) =
(
αθ
ρ
i
+βeρ
i
) 1
ρ , with α,β > 0 (except for the limiting case of perfect comple-
ments). Thus, the case of perfect substitutes, ρ = 1, is included as well as technologies where
effort and ability are complements to different degrees, such as the standard Cobb-Douglas
technology g (θi, e i)= θαi e
β
i
, with α,β> 0 (when ρ approaches zero).
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Distributions of ability In our framework, standard continuous distributions can be em-
ployed with both finite and infinite supports. Moreover, the distributions can be different for
the two players. Examples are the (truncated) Normal distribution, the Exponential distribu-
tion, Student’s t distribution, the Cauchy distribution, and the Uniform distribution.
4 Model solution
We are particularly interested in pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which both players choose
the same level of effort. The following lemma provides a necessary and a sufficient condition
for such a symmetric equilibrium to exist.
Lemma 1. A necessary condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist, in which both players
choose the same effort, is that
∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e is the same for i,k ∈ {1,2}, i 6= k and at least one
e ∈ int E. A sufficient condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist, is that ∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e is
the same for i,k ∈ {1,2}, i 6= k and all e ∈ int E.
We investigate the circumstances under which a symmetric equilibrium exists. We make
use of Lemma 1 and we prove existence of a symmetric equilibrium by checking the sufficient
condition. Since the condition depends on the winning probability, we specify this probability
first. For e> 0, we define the function ge :R→R by ge (x)= g (x, e) with g−1e as the corresponding
inverse. This notation can be motivated by the fact that the event of player i winning over
player k can be written as
g (θk, ek)< g (θi, e i)
⇔ gek (θk)< ge i (θi)
⇔ θk < g−1ek
(
ge i (θi)
)
.
Considering all potential realizations of θi and θk, the winning probability of player i is
Pi(e i, ek)=
∫
R
Fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))
f i (x)dx.
Theorem 1. A symmetric equilibrium in which both players choose the same level of effort
always exists.
Theorem 1 states that, even if the players are asymmetric (i.e., f1 6= f2), there always exists
a symmetric equilibrium of the contest game. This result is of great importance since it allows
a tractable analysis of contests between asymmetric players in a variety of different settings.
The intuition for the theorem is as follows. A marginal increase in player i’s effort affects
the outcome of the contest only in cases where both players’ contributions to the contest are
identical (g(θi, e i)= g(θ j, e j)). If, on the other hand, g(θi, e i)> g(θ j, e j), player i would win the
contest for sure, implying that a marginal increase in e i would not affect the contest outcome.
The same is true if g(θi, e i) < g(θ j, e j). Here, a marginal increase in e i would not suffice to
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overcome player i’s disadvantage and player i would lose despite the higher effort. The two
players do not know θ1 and θ2, so they do not know whose contribution to the contest is higher.
But they infer that marginally increasing effort has an effect on the contest outcome only
if g(θ1, e1) = g(θ2, e2). In a symmetric equilibrium with e1 = e2 > 0, the latter equation is
equivalent to θ1 = θ2.7 This means that players’ abilities are the same in all cases which
matter in the sense that a marginal increase in effort has an effect on the contest outcome.
Notice that this holds true even if f1 and f2 differ. As the players have the same technology,
and the same cost function, θ1 = θ2 implies that they have the same incentive to exert effort
and a symmetric equilibrium always exists.
To see this formally, notice that the derivative of player i’s winning probability with respect
to e i is
∂Pi(e i, ek)
∂e i
=
∫
R
fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
)) d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
)
f i (x)dx.
Defining ae : R→ R by ae(x)= dde i g
−1
ek
(
ge i (x)
)∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
and recognizing that g−1ek (ge i (x))|e1=e2=e =
x, allows us to write the first-order condition for the optimal effort level for player i in a sym-
metric equilibrium as follows:
V
∫
R
ae(x) fk (x) f i (x)dx= c′(e)⇐⇒V
∫
R
ae(x) f1 (x) f2 (x)dx= c′(e).
The key thing to notice is that this condition does not depend on i, and a mathematically
equivalent condition would have been obtained had we started from the perspective of player
k.
Defining re,i :R→R given by re,i(x)= ae(x) f i (x), the above condition can be written as:
V
∫
R
re,i(x) fk (x)dx= c′(e). (1)
The reason for introducing the notation re,i is that it describes, for a given realization of θk, the
marginal effect of effort on the probability of outperforming the rival player. Accordingly, the
integral on the LHS of the re-written condition above reflects the average marginal effect of
effort on the probability of winning across all realizations of θk. The properties of the function
re,i will be of great importance for the comparative-statics results that we derive in the next
sections. We therefore wish to emphasize that it depends both on the production technology
(via ae) and on the skill distribution (via f i).
We end this section with an illustrative example in which we calculate the equilibrium for
two different skill distributions. Consider the multiplicative production technology g(θi, e i) =
θie i, and the cost function c(e i) = e2i /2. Assume further that the skill distribution of player 1
follows a Uniform distribution on [1,2], and the skill distribution of player 2 is given by the
7Notice that, while the event θ1 = θ2 happens with zero probability, the corresponding density, affecting players’
incentive to exert effort, is strictly positive.
8
Student-t distribution on support (−∞,∞), with one degree of freedom, such that:
f1(s)=

1 1≤ s≤ 20 otherwise , f2(x)=
1
pi(1+ x2) , x ∈R.
The event of player 1 winning is described by g(θ1, e1) > g(θ2, e2) ⇐⇒ θ2 < g−1e2 (ge1(θ1)) =
θ1e1/e2. The probability of that event, and its first derivative with respect to e1 are
P1(e1, e2)=
∫∞
−∞
F2
(
x
e1
e2
)
f1(x)dx,
∂P1(e1, e2)
∂e1
=
∫∞
−∞
f2
(
x
e1
e2
)(
x
e2
)
f1(x)dx.
The first-order condition of player 1’s maximization problem is
∂P1(e1, e2)
∂e1
V = e1.
In a symmetric equilibrium with e := e1 = e2, this can now be written as
V
∫∞
−∞
f2 (x)xf1(x)dx= e2.
For player 2 we obtain the same expression. Using our distributional assumptions, the left-
hand side becomes
V
∫∞
−∞
f2 (x)xf1(x)dx=V
∫2
1
x
pi(1+ x2)dx=V
1
2pi
log
(
5
2
)
.
We thus have a symmetric equilibrium, and the corresponding effort is e∗ =
√
V log( 5
2
)
2pi
≈ 0.38
p
V .
5 Comparative statics results in the two player model
In this section, we investigate the consequences of making players more heterogeneous (in
terms of the statistical properties of their skill distributions) on the incentive to exert effort.
To facilitate the analysis, we need one additional assumption.
Assumption 2. The primitives of the model are such that q :E→R, defined by
q(e)=V
∫
R
re,i(x) fk (x)dx− c′(e), i,k ∈ {1,2}, i 6= k
is monotonically decreasing.
Assumption 2 is not very strict and is always satisfied if
∫
R
re,i(x) fk (x)dx is non-increasing
in e because of the assumed strict convexity of c. To give a specific example, consider the CES
production function g(θi, e i)=
(
αθ
ρ
i
+βeρ
i
) 1
ρ , with α,β> 0 and ρ ≤ 1. Here ae (x)= βα
(
x
e
)1−ρ
, im-
plying that
∫
R
ae(x) f1 (x) f2 (x)dx = eρ−1
∫
R
β
α
x1−ρ f1 (x) f2 (x)dx. For this specification, Assump-
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tion 2 is satisfied in all cases where the worker has an incentive to exert positive effort (i.e.,∫
R
β
α
x1−ρ f1 (x) f2 (x)dx> 0). Furthermore, the assumption ensures that effort is always increas-
ing in the prize and that the considered equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric equi-
libria.
5.1 First-order stochastic dominance
A standard result in contest theory is that heterogeneity among players with respect to their
skills reduces the incentive to exert effort (see, e.g., Schotter & Weigelt 1992, or Observation 1
in the survey by Chowdhury et al. 2019). In our framework, this standard result is potentially
reversed, as we will now show.
Consider a contest with two players with skills drawn from two distributions with expected
values µk and µi, respectively. If, from the outset, µk >µi and the difference µk−µi is increased,
then the two players become more heterogeneous in terms of their expected skill. Based on this
idea, we proceed by investigating the consequences of making players more heterogeneous in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. The following definition makes clear what we
mean when we say that one contest is more heterogeneous than another contest in a first-order
sense.
Definition 1. Let µk and µi refer to the expected values of the skill distributions in an initial
contest (Fk,Fi), k, i ∈ {1,2},k 6= i. Players in a contest with skill distributions (F˜k,Fi), are said to
be more heterogeneous (with respect to their skills) relative to players in the initial contest with
skill distributions (Fk,Fi), in a first-order sense, if either of the following conditions hold:
(i) µk ≥µi and F˜k dominates Fk in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
(ii) µk ≤µi and F˜k is dominated by Fk in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
We are now in a position to derive our second main result. Due to Assumption 2, equi-
librium effort increases if a change in the primitives of the model leads to an increase in∫
R
re,i(x) fk (x)dx. Interestingly, this expression has the same structure as a decision maker’s
expected utility in decision theory (e.g., Levy 1992), where the function re,i is replaced by the
decision maker’s utility function. Since the structure of the problems is the same, we can make
extensive use of results from decision theory in our analysis. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider two contests with skill distributions (F˜k,Fi) and (Fk,Fi) and let e˜
∗ and
e∗ denote the associated (symmetric) equilibrium efforts. Then, e˜∗ > e∗ if either one of the
following statements hold:
(i) re,i(x) is monotonically increasing in x for all values of e and F˜k dominates Fk in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance.
(ii) re,i(x) is monotonically decreasing in x for all values of e and F˜k is dominated by Fk in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
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The intuition behind Theorem 2 is as follows. For a given realization of θk, re,i describes
the marginal effect of effort on the probability of outperforming the rival player. If re,i is
monotonically increasing, then effort has a greater effect on the outcome of the contest for
large values of θk relative to smaller ones. Hence, if F˜k first-order stochastically dominates
Fk, larger values of θk are relatively more likely under distribution F˜k and effort has a greater
overall impact on the contest outcome. As an immediate consequence, players have a higher
incentive to exert effort. The interesting observation is that this is not only the case for player
k (whose ability distribution is changed), but also for the opponent player i. The same intuition
applies if re,i is decreasing. Here, the incentive to exert effort increases if player k becomes
weaker (in expectation).
Note that Theorem 2 holds independently of whether µk ≤µi or µk ≥µi. Combining Defini-
tion 1 with Theorem 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Effort can be higher when contestants are more heterogeneous in a first-order
sense.
There is one small caveat to Corollary 1 that we should highlight. If e∗ increases as contes-
tants become more heterogeneous, then a symmetric equilibrium in which both players exert
positive effort will fail to exist if the heterogeneity between players becomes too large. The
reason is that the weaker player would eventually receive a negative payoff, meaning that this
player would prefer to choose zero effort.
We illustrate the theorem and its corollary with two examples. In the first example, re,i(x)
is monotonically increasing and effort gets higher as player k becomes stronger. In the second
example, re,i(x) is monotonically decreasing and effort gets higher as player k becomes weaker.
The examples also serve to illustrate that re,i(x) depends on both the production technology
and the skill distribution.
Example 1. Suppose that g(θ, e)= θ · e, θi ∼U[0,1], θk ∼U[1/4,3/4], θ˜k ∼U[5/16,13/16], c(e)=
e2
2
, V = 1. Then e∗ = 1/
p
2= 0.707 and e˜∗ = 0.7506.
Notice first that the positive slope of re,i(x) in Example 1 is driven by the multiplicative
production technology since it implies that ae(x)= x/e whereas the skill distribution is uniform.
The intuition for the increase in effort is as follows. Suppose that, starting from a situation
where two players have the same expected ability, one of the players becomes stronger and
the contest becomes asymmetric as a result. The effect of a marginal increase in a player’s
effort on the contest outcome is positive only if players’ contributions to the contest are exactly
the same, as explained before. The increase in the player’s strength increases both players’
expected ability when conditioning on the relevant event where both players’ contributions to
the contest are equally high. Since ability and effort are complements in the multiplicative
production technology, players thus have a higher incentive to exert effort. As mentioned
before, it is interesting that this happens for both players and not only for the player whose
ability distribution was changed.
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Example 2. Suppose that g(θ, e)= θ+e, θi ∼Exp(4/3), θk ∼U[1/2,1], θ˜k ∼U[7/16,15/16], c(e)=
e2
2
, V = 1. Then e∗ = 0.499 and e˜∗ = 0.543.
The negative slope of re,i(x) in Example 2 is driven by the skill distribution (the decreasing
pdf of the exponential distribution) since ae(x) = 1 with the given production technology. The
intuition for the increase in equilibrium effort here is similar as for Example 1. If one of the
players becomes weaker, then the expected value of both players’ ability in the only relevant
event when both players’ contributions to the contest are exactly the same, is reduced. Since
the pdf of the exponential distribution is decreasing, the players therefore “move" to higher
values of the pdf, meaning that a marginal change in effort has a greater effect on the winning
probability. Again, the incentive to exert effort is greater as a result.
Concluding this section, we note that the conditions in Theorem 2 are sufficient, but not
necessary conditions for the result that effort can be higher when contestants are more het-
erogeneous. To illustrate this, we present an additional result based on normal distributions
where we first determine the marginal winning probability in a situation with symmetric ef-
fort.
Proposition 1. Suppose that θi ∼ N (µi,σ2i ), θk ∼ N (µk,σ2k), and g(θ, e) = θ · e. Then the
marginal winning probability when e1 = e2 = e is
∂Pi(e i, ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e =
(µiσ
2
k
+µkσ2i )exp{−
(µi−µk)2
2(σ2
i
+σ2
k
)
}
(2pi)
1
2 (σ2
i
+σ2
k
)
3
2
.
In the above Proposition 1, it can be verified that re,i(x) = ae(x) f i (x) is neither always in-
creasing nor always decreasing, by virtue of the multiplicative production technology combined
with the bell-shaped normal distribution. Nonetheless, as illustrated by the following example,
equilibrium effort increases as players become more heterogeneous in the sense of increasing
the distance |µi−µk|.
Example 3. Consider Proposition 1 and assume that (σ1,σ2) = (1,1), (µ1,µ2) = (12 , 12 ), V = 1,
and c(e)= e2
2
. Then equilibrium effort is e∗ = 1
2 4
p
pi
≈ 0.38. If we increase µ1 from 12 to 32 , keeping
µ2 constant, equilibrium effort increases to e
∗ = exp{−0.125}p
2 4
p
pi
≈ 0.47.
5.2 Second-order stochastic dominance
The studies by Hvide (2002), Kräkel & Sliwka (2004), Kräkel (2008), Gilpatric (2009), and De-
Varo & Kauhanen (2016) investigate how “risk" or “uncertainty" affects players’ incentive to
exert effort in contests. One result that is common to all of these analyses is that in contests
between homogeneous players, higher risk (as measured by a higher variance of the random
variables capturing the uncertainty of the contest outcome) leads to lower efforts. We revisit
this result in the context of our model and show that effort may increase as the ability distri-
bution of one of the players becomes more uncertain (in the sense of second-order stochastic
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dominance). In the following definition we formalize what we mean when we say that one skill
distribution is more uncertain than another one (see Rothschild & Stiglitz 1970 for details)
Definition 2. The ability distribution F˜ j is said to be more uncertain than the distribution F j
if F˜ j is a mean-preserving spread of F j. This is equivalent to F˜ j being dominated by F j in the
sense of second-order stochastic dominance.
Equipped with this definition, we can use well-known results from decision theory to obtain
our next theorem:
Theorem 3. Consider two contests with skill distributions (F˜k,Fi) and (Fk,Fi) and let e˜
∗ and
e∗ denote the associated (symmetric) equilibrium efforts. Suppose that F˜k is more uncertain
than Fk. Then, the following results hold:
(i) If re,i is convex for all values of e, then e˜
∗ > e∗
(ii) If re,i is linear for all values of e, then e˜
∗ = e∗
(iii) If re,i is concave for all values of e, then e˜
∗ < e∗
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Applying a mean-preserving spread to the
distribution Fk shifts probability mass from the center to the tails of the distribution. If re,i is
convex, then effort has a greater impact on the outcome of the contest and the players have a
higher incentive to exert effort. If re,i is concave, then the opposite happens and equilibrium
effort decreases. Finally, if re,i is linear, effort remains unchanged.
Next, we define contestant heterogeneity in a second-order sense and we follow the struc-
ture of the corresponding definition of heterogeneity in a first-order sense. In that definition,
we used the ranking of players’ mean abilities to characterize the initial situation. In the new
definition, we do so through the variances of the skill distributions of the competing players.
Notice, however, that variance is not always a good measure of uncertainty or risk (see e.g,
Rothschild & Stiglitz 1970). Therefore one should keep in mind, when applying the definition
below, that higher variance entails higher uncertainty only for certain skill distributions (e.g.,
the normal distribution).
Definition 3. Let Vark and Var i refer to the variances of the skill distributions in an initial
contest (Fk,Fi), k, i ∈ {1,2},k 6= i. Players in a contest with skill distributions (F˜k,Fi), are said to
be more heterogeneous (with respect to their skills) relative to players in the initial contest with
skill distributions (Fk,Fi), in a second-order sense, if either of the following conditions hold:
(i) Vark ≥Var i and Fk dominates F˜k in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance.
(ii) Vark ≤ Var i and Fk is dominated by F˜k in the sense of second-order stochastic domi-
nance.
Combining Theorem 3 with Definition 3, we have the following corallary.
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Corollary 2. Effort can be higher when contestants are more heterogeneous in a second-order
sense.
Notice that Theorem 3 also holds if players have the same expected ability, namely µi =µk.
This means that, in a contest with two players who are expected to be equally able, higher
uncertainty regarding players’ abilities may increase the incentive to exert effort, in contrast
to what the existing contest literature has shown.
The following example, set in the context of the Lazear-Rosen framework with an additive
production technology (for which ae(x)= 1), illustrates this result. We assume a convex pdf f1
(an exponential distribution) to make the function re,1 convex. For player 2, we enlarge the
support of a uniform distribution (on a subset of the support of f1) to create a mean-preserving
spread.
Example 4. Suppose the additive production function g(θi, e i) = θi + e i, the parameter V = 1,
and the cost function c(e)= e2
2
. Suppose player 1’s ability θ1 follows the exponential distribution
with parameter λ = 1, while player 2’s ability is uniformly distributed on [0.5,1.5] (notice that
these distributional assumptions imply µ1 = µ2 = 1). The equilibrium effort is then e∗ ≈ 0.38.
Now, consider a mean-preserving spread of player 2’s uniform distribution, enlarging the sup-
port to [0,2]. Then effort increases to e∗ ≈ 0.43.
We are thus able to demonstrate, by example, that increasing uncertainty can increase
effort in a contest in which both players have the same expected ability. In order to further
illustrate the results of Theorem 3, we consider a linear function re,i. In this case, we confirm
that equilibrium effort (and payoff) is not affected as ability becomes more uncertain.
Example 5. Suppose the additive production function g(θi, e i) = θi + e i, the parameter V = 1,
and the cost function c(e)= e2
2
. Suppose further that abilities are uniformly distributed. Player
1’s ability has support [0,2] while player 2’s has support [0.5,1.5]. Then equilibrium effort
is e∗ = 0.5, and equilibrium payoffs are pii(e∗, e∗) = 0.375 . Now, consider a mean-preserving
spread of player 2’s uniform distribution, enlarging the support to [0,2]. Then both efforts and
payoffs in equilibrium remain unchanged.
6 The case of more than two players (n> 2)
In the contest literature as well as in applications, how effort depends on the number of contes-
tants is of interest. In order to address this question, we turn to the case of n> 2 contestants.8
6.1 The n= 2main result does not extend to n> 2
In the case of n > 2 players with different skill distributions, the equilibrium in our model is
generally no longer symmetric. A player i will only win the contest if he/she beats all of his/her
8Contests with more than two players have been studied by, e.g., Tullock (1980), Nalebuff & Stiglitz (1983),
Hillman & Riley (1989), Chen (2003), and Münster (2007).
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opponents. Essentially, each player is thus competing against the best of the other players,
that is, the largest order statistic, and therefore faces a different “rival” in the contest. This
introduces an asymmetry into the model that was absent in the 2-player case which gener-
ally leads to an asymmetric equilibrium. To see this formally, suppose, for simplicity, that
g (θi, e i)= θi+ e i, implying that ae (x)= 1 (the following intuition also holds for general produc-
tion technologies). Then, using a similar reasoning as in the two-player case (see section 4),
the marginal probability of winning for player 1 and player 2 in a symmetric equilibrium can
be written, respectively, as: ∫
R
f1 (x)
d
dx
(
F2 (x)
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
)
dx
and ∫
R
f2 (x)
d
dx
(
F1 (x)
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
)
dx.
Applying the product differentiation rule, the marginal winning probabilities can be restated
as
∫
R
(
f1 (x) f2 (x)
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)+ f1 (x)F2 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
))
dx
and ∫
R
(
f2 (x) f1 (x)
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)+ f2 (x)F1 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
))
dx.
The first term in each of the expressions corresponds to the situation, in which players 3 to n
perform worse than players 1 and 2 so that the n-player contest collapses to a contest between
players 1 and 2. Here, the marginal winning probabilities are the same, as shown in the
analysis of the 2-player contest. The second term in each of the expressions corresponds to the
situation, in which player 2 (first expression) or player 1 (second expression) performs worse
than player 1 (first expression) or player 2 (second expression) so that the contest boils down
to a contest between the considered player and the strongest one of the players 3 to n.
Setting the first expression equal to the second, we obtain
∫
R
f1 (x)F2 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
)
dx=
∫
R
f2 (x)F1 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
)
dx
⇔
∫
R
(
f1 (x)
F1 (x)
− f2 (x)
F2 (x)
)
F1 (x)F2 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
Fi (x)
)
dx= 0.
In general, the latter equality is not fulfilled and a symmetric equilibrium does not exist. A
symmetric equilibrium would occur if the skill distribution associated with each player had the
same constant reversed hazard rate (i.e., f i(x)/Fi(x)= const for all i ∈ {1, ...,n}, see e.g., Chandra
& Roy 2001), in which case we could solve the general case for more than two players in the
same way as we did for the two-player case. To the best of our knowledge, however, there are no
known examples of parametric distributions with constant reversed hazard rates on (−∞,∞)
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(see e.g., Rinne 2014). This implies that our solution method generally cannot be extended
to the case of n > 2 players. Therefore, we mainly look at the case of homogeneous players
in this section (maintaining the generality of our assumed production technology). We also
examine a special case of our model which demonstrates that a symmetric equilibrium can
exist even when players are asymmetric (in the sense of having different skill distributions)
and the number of players n is greater than two.
6.2 The case of homogeneous players
Consider a contest in which all players have the same skill distribution f1 = f2 = ...= fn =: f .
Proposition 2. In an n-player contest with homogeneous skill distributions, a symmetric Nash
equilibrium with e∗1 = ...= e∗n =: e∗ exists and is characterized by
V
∫
R
re∗ (x) (n−1)(F (x))n−2 f (x)dx=V
∫
R
re∗ (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n−1
)
dx= c′
(
e∗
)
.
Notice that (F (x))n−1 describes the cdf of the largest order statistic out of a group of n−1
players. The condition from the proposition therefore illustrates what we claimed before: the
n-player contest boils down to a two-player contest, in which every player competes against
the strongest of the other players.
A particular focus in the literature has been on the relation between effort and the number
of competitors. Early studies of the n-player Tullock contest with γ1 = ...= γn, m= 1, and linear
effort cost found that equilibrium effort is given by e∗ = n−1
n2
V , so that effort is decreasing in n
(e.g., Tullock 1980, Hillman & Riley 1989). With a convex cost function (as in our setting), the
condition would change to e∗c′ (e∗)= n−1
n2
V , but effort would still be decreasing in n. The result
can be explained by a discouragement effect. If a player competes against many rivals, his/her
chance of winning is relatively low and the player reduces effort in turn.
In what follows, we study the relationship between effort and the number of competitors in
our framework. To do so, we need to extend Assumption 2 to the n-player case.
Assumption 3. The primitives of the model are such that qn :E→R, defined by
qn(e)=V
∫
R
re (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n−1
)
dx− c′(e),
is monotonically decreasing.
We observe that, in addition to the discouragement effect mentioned before, there is also an
encouragement effect, inducing players to increase their effort as they compete against more
players. This is reflected by the term (n−1) in
∫
R
re∗ (x) (n−1)(F (x))n−2 f (x)dx in Proposition
2 above. As we will show, the encouragement effect might dominate, opening up for the possi-
bility that effort increases as the number of competitors increase. In our proof, we use the fact
that increasing n leads to a distribution of the largest order statistic that first-order stochas-
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tically dominates the original distribution. We can thus invoke Theorem 2 to study the effects
of an increase in n on equilibrium effort.
Theorem 4. i) If re(x) is monotonically increasing in x for all values of e, then e
∗ is increasing
in n.
ii) If re(x) is monotonically decreasing in x for all values of e, then e
∗ is decreasing in n.
iii) If re(x) is constant for all values of e, then e
∗ is independent of n.
Notice that similar to what was mentioned in connection to Corollary 1, there is a small
caveat to part (i) of Theorem 4. If e∗ is increasing in n, a symmetric equilibrium in which all
players exert positive effort will fail to exist if n becomes so large that V /n < c(e∗), as (some)
players would prefer to choose an effort of zero.
We conclude this subsection with an example to illustrate the potentially positive relation-
ship between effort and the number of players in the context of the well-known Lazear-Rosen
model that is a special case of our model.
Example 6. Consider a contest with an additive production function g(θi, e i)= θi+ e i, µi = 1,
V = 1, and a cost function given by c(e)= e2
2
. Suppose θi is distributed according to the modified
(µi = 1) reflected exponential distribution with parameter λ = 0.5. With two players, effort is
e∗ = 0.25. With three players, effort increases to e∗ = 0.33.
6.3 A contest with one player who is more highly skilled
We now turn to a special case of our contest model with n> 2, for which we obtain a symmetric
equilibrium even when players have asymmetric skill distributions. For this purpose, suppose
that θi can be written as θi = ti+εi, where t2 = ...= tn =: t and t1 > t, so that player 1 is more
able than the other players in expectation. We define ∆t := t1− t. The εi are i.i.d. and follow
the reflected exponential distribution, defined by the following pdf and cdf.
f i (x)=
{
λ ·exp {λx} , for x< 0
0, for x≥ 0,
with λ> 0, and
Fi (x)=
{
exp {λx} , for x< 0
1, for x≥ 0.
In this case, the reversed hazard rate d
dx
logFi(x) = f i(x)Fi(x) is constant and equal to λ on the
support of f i which is (−∞,0]. We can show the following result:
Proposition 3. Consider an n-player contest where players have i.i.d. skill terms εi drawn
from the reflected exponential distribution. Suppose that one player in expectation is more
highly skilled than the other n−1 players who share the same expected skill. Then, a symmetric
equilibrium exists in which all players choose the same equilbrium effort e∗.
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Notice that no particular assumptions are being imposed on the production technology in
Proposition 3. To understand why a symmetric equilibrium exists, consider the condition
∫
R
(
f1 (x)
F1 (x)
− f2 (x)
F2 (x)
)
F1 (x)F2 (x)
d
dx
(
n∏
i=3
(Fi (x))
)
dx= 0,
that we derived in Subsection 6.1. Notice that, for player 1, the upper bound of the support is
t1, whereas for the other players it is t (since the upper bound of the support of the reflected
exponential distribution is zero). For x < t, we have f1(x)
F1(x)
= f2(x)
F2(x)
since the reversed hazard
rate is constant. For x ≥ t, we have
n∏
i=3
(Fi (x)) = 1⇒ ddx
(
n∏
i=3
(Fi (x))
)
= 0. Hence, the marginal
winning probabilities are the same.
If we make a particular assumption on the production technology, we can obtain an expres-
sion for the marginal winning probability in the symmetric equilibrium, and calculate how
effort depends on the number of players, as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 4. Consider the contest described in Proposition 3. Suppose the production tech-
nology takes the form g(θi, e i) = θie i and assume that t is chosen sufficiently large such that
nλt−1> 0. Then, the marginal winning probability in the symmetric equilibrium is equal to:
Ψ(n)= (n−1)
e∗
exp {−λ∆t} (nλt−1)
n2
, with Ψ′(n)> 0,
implying that equilibrium effort is increasing in effort n.
The above Proposition 4 further substantiates our finding that larger contests can lead to
higher effort.
7 Implications for optimal workforce composition
Our analysis has implications for optimal workforce composition and organizational design. In
particular, our results suggest that employers could find it desirable to employ a more hetero-
geneous workforce as an instrument to induce higher effort. In the paper, we have analyzed
two ways of making players in a contest more heterogeneous. First, we have analyzed the
effects of increasing the heterogeneity in workers’ expected skills, and shown how this can
increase equilibrium effort. This means that a firm could benefit (from the perspective of in-
ducing higher effort) by hiring some workers with a high expected ability and some with a low
expected ability, based on, for example, signals such as the quality of the institution where a
college graduate received his/her degree. Second, we have shown how increased uncertainty
regarding abilities of some players can increase equilibrium effort. Thus, a firm could bene-
fit from hiring a mix of experienced workers (for whom the uncertainty regarding abilities is
relatively small) and inexperienced workers (for whom the uncertainty regarding abilities is
relatively large).
To see this more formally, suppose a firm already employs a worker with ability distribution
F1 and considers to hire another worker with ability distribution F2. Moreover, assume that
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re,1(x) is monotonically decreasing and convex (for example, by assuming that the production
function is given by g(θ, e)= θ+ e and skills are Exponentially distributed with parameter λ).9
Then, the firm may gain from hiring another worker with a lower expected ability (µ2 < µ1),
but where F2 is more uncertain (meaning that worker 2 is drawn from a more uncertain skill
distribution). This finding can be understood from the perspective of Theorem 2, that tells us
that effort will be higher due to the lower expected ability of worker 2, combined with Theorem
3, which tells us that effort will be higher due to the larger uncertainty regarding the skill of
player 2. In other words, hiring a worker with a lower expected ability, drawn from a more
uncertain distribution, can induce higher effort. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 also have other
managerial implications as they indicate that employers may want to hire workers who have
worked on different tasks in the past, to create uncertainty about workers’ abilities. In a
similar vein, it might be desirable to implement some kind of job rotation.
8 Concluding remarks
We have presented a novel framework to study contests between heterogeneous players. Under
general assumptions about the production technology and the distribution of skills, we have
shown that the contest has a symmetric equilibrium, in which all players exert the same effort.
We have constructed a link between our contest model and standard models of decision-making
under risk (expected utility theory) and exploited this link to revisit important comparative
statics results of contest theory. We have shown that standard results in the literature are not
robust to generalizations of the production technology or skill distributions. In particular, we
have found that making skill distributions more heterogeneous (in terms of first and second
moments), or increasing the number of contestants, can increase equilibrium effort. Finally,
we have discussed optimal workforce composition and concluded that employers could find it
desirable to increase the heterogeneity of the workforce in terms of the statistical properties of
the skill distributions of the competing players.
A possible next step would be to use our framework to study additional aspects of tourna-
ment design. For instance, prior work has investigated strategic information revelation by the
tournament designer (e.g., Aoyagi 2010, Ederer 2010, Gürtler et al. 2013). If the tournament
designer possesses some private information about the players’ abilities, he or she may decide
to reveal some or all of this information to trigger higher effort by the players. Another exam-
ple would be to allow for different prize structures in the n-player case and investigate how
effort depends on the prize structure. For example, one alternative prize structure would be to
award the prize V to the n−1 best-performing players, and a prize of zero to the worst perform-
ing player. This would change Theorem 4 since every player now would compete against the
lowest order statistic associated with the opponent players. The lowest order statistic becomes
9An alternative skill distribution that would also be decreasing and convex would be a normal distribution that
is truncated to the left at a point to the right of the second inflection point. Such a distribution could be motivated
by the observation that abilities are often normally distributed and that, when employing worker 1, the firm tried
to hire the most able applicant, meaning that abilities in the higher end of the distribution are most relevant (see
e.g., Aguinis & O’Boyle Jr. 2014).
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weaker as the number of players increase, implying that the relationship between effort and
the number of players would change. Summing up, we believe that our new contest framework
opens up many avenues for interesting future research.
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9 Appendix
All proofs and computations will be presented in the order in which they appear in the paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for given effort ek of the other player,
player i chooses e i to maximize pii. Denote player i’s best response by e
∗
i
(ek). We know that
e∗
i
(ek) ∈ E. Since E is compact and pii is a continuous function of e i, the maximum of pii on E
exists (by the Weierstrass theorem).
Denote the pair of Nash equilibrium efforts by (e∗1, e
∗
2). From Assumption 1, we know that
e∗
i
(e∗
k
) ∈ int E and that it is characterized by the first-order condition to the problem of max-
imizing pii. This in turn implies that (e
∗
1, e
∗
2) is determined by
∂Pi
∂e i
(e∗
i
, e∗
k
)V = c′(e∗
i
) for both
i ∈ {1,2}.
In a symmetric equilibrium with effort e∗ ∈ int E, the pair of first-order conditions becomes
∂P1(e1, e2)
∂e1
|e1=e2=e∗V − c′(e∗)= 0
and
∂P2(e2, e1)
∂e2
|e1=e2=e∗V − c′(e∗)= 0.
A necessary condition for both these conditions to be fulfilled (and thus, a symmetric equi-
librium to exist), is that
∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e is the same for both i ∈ {1,2} and at least one e ∈ int
E.
It remains to be shown that a sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilib-
rium is that
∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e is the same for both i ∈ {1,2} and all e ∈ int E. Given this condition,
we observe
∂P1(e1,e2)
∂e1
|e1=e2=eV−c′(e)= ∂P2(e2,e1)∂e2 |e1=e2=eV−c
′(e) for all e ∈ int E. Since pii(e i, ek) is
continuously differentiable,
∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=eV−c′(e) is a continuous function of e. Furthermore,
recall that there exists e¯ i, e˘ i ∈ int E such that ∂pii(e i ,ek)∂e i |e1=e2=e¯ i < 0 and
∂pii(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e˘ i > 0.
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem some e∗ ∈ int E with ∂Pi(e i ,ek)
∂e i
|e1=e2=e∗V − c′(e∗)= 0
exists.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Assumption 1, each player i chooses e i > 0 with probability 1 in any
equilibrium. Then, the function ge :R→R defined by ge (x)= g (x, e) is monotonically increasing
and, thus, invertible. The inverse, g−1e , is increasing as well. For the two (different) players
i,k ∈ {1,2}, we observe
g (θi, e i)< g (θk, ek)
⇔ ge i (θi)< gek (θk)
⇔ θi < g−1e i
(
gek (θk)
)
.
25
Player k thus wins with probability
∫
Fi
(
g−1e i
(
gek (x)
))
fk (x)dx.
Differentiating with respect to ek, we obtain
∫
f i
(
g−1e i
(
gek (x)
))( d
dek
g−1e i
(
gek (x)
))
fk (x)dx.
According to Lemma 1, a sufficient condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist is that
∫(
d
de1
g−1e2
(
ge1 (x)
)∣∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
)
f1 (x) f2 (x)dx
=
∫(
d
de2
g−1e1
(
ge2 (x)
)∣∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
)
f1 (x) f2 (x)dx,
for all e ∈ int E. Since d
de1
g−1e2
(
ge1 (x)
)∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
= d
de2
g−1e1
(
ge2 (x)
)∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
, this condition is always
fulfilled.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, re,i (x) is monotonically increasing in x
and F˜k first-order stochastically dominates Fk. Denote the optimal effort levels for the two
distributions by e˜∗ and e∗. Our goal is to show that e˜∗ > e∗.
The proof proceeds by contradiction, so suppose e˜∗ ≤ e∗. Now observe that
V
∫
r e˜∗,i (x) f˜k (x)dx− c′
(
e˜∗
)
≥
V
∫
re∗,i (x) f˜k (x)dx− c′
(
e∗
)
>
V
∫
re∗,i (x) fk (x)dx− c′
(
e∗
)
= 0.
The first inequality follows from e˜∗ ≤ e∗ together with Assumption 2. The second inequality
follows from re,i (x) being monotonically increasing and F˜k first-order stochastically dominating
Fk (see, e.g., Levy 1992, p. 557). The equality follows since e
∗ is characterized by the first-order
condition V
∫
re∗,i (x) fk (x)dx− c′ (e∗)= 0. We conclude that
V
∫
r e˜∗,i (x) f˜k (x)dx− c′
(
e˜∗
)
> 0,
showing that the first-order condition in the case of distribution F˜k cannot be fulfilled. This
gives us the desired contradiction.
By an analogous argument we can show that e˜∗ > e∗ also in the case where re,i is monoton-
ically decreasing in x for all e > 0 and Fk first-order stochastically dominates F˜k, since in this
case,
∫
re,i(x) f˜k (x)dx>
∫
re,i(x) fk (x)dx for all e> 0 (see, e.g., Levy 1992, p. 557).
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that g(θ, e)= θe. This means that
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))∣∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
= d
de i
(
xe i
ek
)∣∣∣∣
e1=e2=e
= x
e
.
In the considered situation, the marginal winning probability is
1
2piσ1σ2
∫
x
e
exp
{
−0.5(x−µ1)
2
σ2
1
−0.5(x−µ2)
2
σ2
2
}
dx.
To prove the lemma, it needs to be shown that
1
2piσ1σ2
∫
xexp
{
−0.5(x−µ1)
2
σ2
1
−0.5(x−µ2)
2
σ2
2
}
dx
=
(
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
)
exp
{
− (µ1−µ2)
2
2(σ21+σ22)
}
(2pi)0.5
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)1.5 .
Define
Z := 1
2piσ1σ2
∫
xexp
{
−0.5(x−µ1)
2
σ2
2
−0.5(x−µ1)
2
σ2
2
}
dx
and notice that we can state
0.5
(x−µ1)2
σ2
1
+0.5(x−µ2)
2
σ2
2
=
σ22
(
x−µ1
)2 (
σ21+σ22
)
+σ21
(
x−µ2
)2 (
σ21+σ22
)
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
=
σ22
(
x2−2xµ1+µ21
)(
σ21+σ22
)
+σ21
(
x2−2xµ2+µ22
)(
σ21+σ22
)
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
=
x2
(
σ21+σ22
)
−2x
(
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
)(
σ21+σ22
)
+
(
µ21σ
2
2+µ22σ21
)(
σ21+σ22
)
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
=
x2
(
σ21+σ22
)2−2x (µ1σ22+µ2σ21)(σ21+σ22)+ (µ1σ22+µ2σ21)2
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
−
(
µ21σ
4
2+2µ1σ22µ2σ21+µ22σ41−µ21σ22
(
σ21+σ22
)
−µ22σ21
(
σ21+σ22
))
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
=
(
x
(
σ21+σ22
)
−
(
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
))2+ (µ21σ21σ22−2µ1σ22µ2σ21+µ22σ21σ22)
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)
=
(
x
(
σ21+σ22
)
−
(
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
))2
2σ2
1
σ2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
) +
(
µ1−µ2
)2
2
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
) .
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Using this, we obtain
Z =
exp
{
− (µ1−µ2)
2
2(σ21+σ22)
}
2piσ1σ2
∫
xexp
{
− (x(σ
2
1
+σ2
2)−(µ1σ22+µ2σ21))
2
2σ2
1
σ2
2(σ
2
1
+σ2
2)
}
dx
=
exp
{
− (µ1−µ2)
2
2(σ21+σ22)
}
(2pi)0.5
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)1.5 (σ21+σ22) 1p2pi σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
∫
xexp

−
(
x−µ1σ
2
2
+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2
2
(
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2

dx.
Now notice that
1p
2pi
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
∫
xexp

−
(
x−µ1σ
2
2
+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2
2
(
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2

dx
describes the mean of a normally distributed random variable with variance
(
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2
and
mean
µ1σ
2
2
+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
, hence
1p
2pi
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
∫
xexp

−
(
x−µ1σ
2
2
+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2
2
(
σ1σ2√
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)2

dx=
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
.
We obtain
Z =
exp
{
− (µ1−µ2)
2
2(σ21+σ22)
}
(2pi)0.5
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)1.5 (σ21+σ22) µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
σ2
1
+σ2
2
=
(
µ1σ
2
2+µ2σ21
)
exp
{
− (µ1−µ2)
2
2(σ21+σ22)
}
(2pi)0.5
(
σ2
1
+σ2
2
)1.5 .
Proof of Theorem 3. Because of Assumption 2 and the condition characterizing equilibrium ef-
fort, we need to show that
∫
re,i(x) f˜k (x)dx> (=,<)
∫
re,i(x) fk (x)dx if re,i is convex (linear, con-
cave). The corresponding proof is completely analogous to part a) of the proof of Theorem 2 in
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970, p.237). In the case of convex re,i, the inequality in their proof is
reversed, while it is replaced by an equality if re,i is linear.
Proof of Proposition 2. Player i wins the contest with probability
∫
Π
k 6=i
Fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))
f i (x)dx.
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Differentiating with respect to e i, we obtain
∫(
Π
k 6=i
Fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
)))∑
k 6=i
fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))
Fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (x)
))

 f i (x)dx.
In a symmetric equilibrium with e∗1 = ... = e∗n =: e∗, the marginal effect of effort on the proba-
bility of winning,
∫(
Π
k 6=i
F (x)
)(∑
k 6=i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=:e∗
f (x)
F (x)
)
f (x)dx,
must be the same for all i. This expression can be restated as
∫
re∗ (x) (n−1)(F (x))n−2 f (x)dx=
∫
re∗ (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n−1
)
dx.
The latter expression is the same for all i.
Proof of Theorem 4. i) We show that
∫
re (x)
(
d
dx (F (x))
n−1)dx is increasing in n. If n1,n2 ∈ N,
with n1 > n2, then (F (x))n1−1 first-order stochastically dominates (F (x))n2−1, and the result
follows from Theorem 2.
ii) Suppose that re(x) is monotonically decreasing in x for all values of e, and let n1,n2 ∈N,
with n1 > n2. It follows that (F (x))n1−1 first-order stochastically dominates (F (x))n2−1, as just
mentioned, implying that
∫
re (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n1−1
)
dx<
∫
re (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n2−1
)
dx.
iii) If re(x) is constant for all values of e, we have
∫
re (x)
(
d
dx
(F (x))n−1
)
dx= re (x)
∫(
d
dx
(F (x))n−1
)
dx= re (x) ,
which is independent of n.
Proof of Proposition 3. Player i outperforms player k iff
ge i (ti+εi)> gek (tk+εk)
⇔ εk < g−1ek
(
ge i (ti+εi)
)
− tk.
Hence, player i wins the contest with probability
∫
Π
k 6=i
Fk
(
g−1ek
(
ge i (ti+ x)
)
− tk
)
f i (x)dx.
Recall that the ε j are i.i.d., so that we can drop the subscripts accompanying the cdfs and
pdfs. In a symmetric equilibrium with e∗1 = ... = e∗n =: e∗, the marginal effect of effort on the
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probability of winning,
∫(
Π
k 6=i
F (ti+ x− tk)
)(∑
k 6=i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (ti+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (ti+ x− tk)
F (ti+ x− tk)
)
f (x)dx,
must be the same for all i. For player 1, we have
∫(
Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=1
(
d
de1
g−1ek
(
ge1 (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (x)dx.
For some other player i ∈ {2, ...,n}, we have
∫(
F (−∆t+ y) Π
k 6=1,i
F (y)
)((
d
de i
g−1e1
(
ge i (t+ y)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (−∆t+ y)
F (−∆t+ y)
+
∑
k 6=1,i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t+ y)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (y)
F (y)
)
f (y)dy.
The map φ1 : Rx→ Ry given by x→ y =∆t+ x is a smooth diffeomorphism with det |φ′1(x)| = 1.
Applying the associated change of variables to the preceding expression, we obtain
∫(
F (x) Π
k 6=1,i
F (∆t+ x)
)((
d
de i
g−1e1
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (x)
F (x)
+
∑
k 6=1,i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (∆t+ x)dx.
The expressions for the two types of players can be restated as
∫(
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=1
(
d
de1
g−1ek
(
ge1 (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (x)
F (x)
dx,
∫(
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)((
d
de i
g−1e1
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (x)
F (x)
+
∑
k 6=1,i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)dx.
Notice that both expressions are equal to zero for x≥−∆t. Hence, they can be restated as
∫−∆t (
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=1
(
d
de1
g−1ek
(
ge1 (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (x)
F (x)
dx,
∫−∆t (
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)((
d
de i
g−1e1
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (x)
F (x)
+
∑
k 6=1,i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)
)
f (∆t+ x)
F (∆t+ x)dx.
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For x<−∆t, we observe f (x)
F(x)
= f (∆t+x)
F(∆t+x) =λ, and the expressions become
λ2
∫−∆t (
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=1
(
d
de1
g−1ek
(
ge1 (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
)
dx,
λ2
∫−∆t (
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
)
dx,
which are the same.
Proof of Proposition 4. As shown before, if g(θi, e i)= θie i, we have
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (ti+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
= (ti+ x)
e∗
.
Thus,
λ2
∫−∆t (
F (x) Π
k 6=1
F (∆t+ x)
)(∑
k 6=i
(
d
de i
g−1ek
(
ge i (t1+ x)
))∣∣∣∣
e∗
1
=...=e∗n=e∗
)
dx
= λ2
∫−∆t
(exp {λx} ·exp {(n−1)λ (∆t+ x)}) (n−1) (t1+ x)
e∗
dx
= λ
2 (n−1)
e∗
∫−∆t
exp {nλy+ (n−1)λ∆t} (t1+ y)dy.
The map φ2 :Rx→Ry given by x→ y=−∆t+x is a smooth diffeomorphism with det |φ′2(x)| =
1. Applying the associated change of variables to the integral, we obtain
λ2 (n−1)
e∗
∫0
exp {nλ (x−∆t)+ (n−1)λ∆t} (t+ x)dx
= (n−1)
e∗
exp {−λ∆t}λ2
(∫0
xexp {nλx}dx+ t
∫0
exp {nλx}dx
)
.
Notice that
nλ
∫0
xexp {nλx}dx
is the mean of a random variable that is distributed according to the reflected exponential
distribution with parameter nλ, hence
nλ
∫0
xexp {nλx}dx=− 1
nλ
⇔
∫0
xexp {nλx}dx=− 1
n2λ2
.
Furthermore,
nλ
∫0
exp {nλx}dx = 1∫0
exp {nλx}dx = 1
nλ
.
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It follows that
(n−1)
e∗
exp {−λ∆t}λ2
(∫0
xexp {nλx}dx+ t
∫0
exp {nλx}dx
)
= (n−1)
e∗
exp {−λ∆t}λ2 (−1+nλt)
n2λ2
= (n−1)
e∗
exp {−λ∆t} (−1+nλt)
n2
.
Taking the derivative of the above expression w.r.t. n results in an expression that is positive
for all parameters such as nλt−1> 0.
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